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We re-examine claims that anthropic arguments provide an explanation for the observed smallness
of the cosmological constant, and argue that correlations between the cosmological constant value
and the existence of life can be demonstrated only under restrictive assumptions. Causal effects are
more subtle to uncover.
The argument that if the cosmological constant (CC)
were much larger than the value inferred from observa-
tions then galaxies wouldn’t have formed and life would
not exist [1, 2] is by now well known. The lack of
any compelling explanation on the basis of fundamen-
tal physics for why the vacuum energy today should be
small has led this anthropic ‘explanation’ to steadily gain
favor, provoking significant work on a so-called “land-
scape” analysis of possible vacua in string theory models,
for example. The anthropic principle is however based
fundamentally on ignorance rather than knowledge; thus
any probabilistic inferences one draws using it should be
carefully interpreted. Not only do we have no funda-
mental theory that might provide an underlying proba-
bility distribution for universes with different CCs, we
know very little about the range of fundamental param-
eters that might allow the evolution of intelligent life in
a universe. In this paper we illustrate a point made very
clearly by Weinberg in his original discussion on the sub-
ject [1], namely that a correlation between a universe
with life as we know it, and the existence of a small CC
need not be understood to imply causation, or as he put
it, our existence as an experimental datum has no real
explanatory power. We further argue that any inferred
correlation between the CC and life strongly depends on
how life is defined. Within the framework of the mul-
tiple vacua suggested by the landscape of string theory,
predictive power about the parameters of our universe
is often claimed to be obtainable through probabilistic
anthropic reasoning about the observability of these pa-
rameters. However, arguments of these sort (i.e. see [3])
strongly rely on the assertion that we must be typical
observers [5], an assertion without sound fundamental
scientific basis at the current time [4].
Life states:
A universe can be categorized by whether it sustains in-
telligent life. For the purpose of this paper we define “in-
telligent life” as a life form capable of measuring the CC
and pondering its value. In other words, we define “life”
as an organism capable of producing scientists. If life ex-
ists, it can be further divided into those life forms which
are sufficiently similar to us that we can estimate the
necessary conditions for existence etc, and those about
which we know nothing. Thus a universe can be in one
of 3 states: 1) qlife: There isn’t any scientist-producing
life whatsoever in the universe. We call this state “not
life”. 2) qus: There is some life, but one which isn’t rec-
ognizable to us, “not us”. We don’t know what it needs
in order to exist and survive. For example a life form
may thrive in a universe where the particle symmetry is
not SU(3)⊗SU(2)⊗U(1). 3) us: There is life in the uni-
verse which is sufficiently similar to us in its biochemical
requirements that its survival criteria are approximately
the same as ours.
Cosmological constant states:
Our life-form can exist with a smaller than the observed
CC, but not much bigger. Let P(Λ, α1 . . . αn) be the
probability distribution function (PDF) of the CC and
other parameters αi, which may include both param-
eters of our fundamental action, and specifications of
initial conditions. We take the CC to be defined over
the range (−m4p,m
4
p), where mp is the Planck mass (al-
though in principle mp too could be included in the
αi). We want to compare two probabilities: 1) The
probability that the CC lies within a narrow range of
values compatible with us. Let us be wildly generous
and say that this encompasses (−100ρc, 100ρc), where
ρc ≃ 10
−47 GeV4 is the critical energy density, P (Λ) ≡∫ +100ρc
−100ρc
P(Λ˜, a1, a2 . . . an)dΛ˜, where ai are the observed
values of αi. 2) The probability that the CC takes a
value which is incompatible with us, P (qΛ) = 1− P (Λ).
Putting all of the above together, we can write the
following statement:
P (Λ)
P (qΛ)
=
P (Λ|life)P (life) + P (Λ|qlife)P (qlife)
P (qΛ|life)P (life) + P (qΛ|qlife)P (qlife)
=
(
P (Λ|us)P (us) + P (Λ|qus)P (qus)
)
+ P (Λ|qlife)P (qlife)(
P (qΛ|us)P (us) + P (qΛ|qus)P (qus)
)
+ P (qΛ|qlife)P (qlife)
.
2This ratio will become large if the observed CC is proba-
ble, and will go to zero if it isn’t. The advantage of look-
ing at the ratio instead of the probabilities themselves is
that in the ratio we may tame some of the terrible nor-
malization issues associated with defining such probabili-
ties over unspecified, and unspecifiedly-large, ensembles.
Life and us:
As the definition of the subcategory “us” has strong ef-
fects on subsequent calculations [6], we now consider a
few ways in which this subcategory can be defined. The
use of observers or any proxy for observers (for example,
reference [3] uses free energy as an observer proxy) as a
statistical measure to determine how likely it will be to
observe a parameter value depends on how the observer
or proxy is defined [10].
A relatively relaxed way to define “us” in the context of
fundamental particle physics is to require that a life form
needs the same known physics that we need, namely the
standard model parameters of SU(3) ⊗ SU(2) ⊗ U(1).
Thus “us” can be defined as {us′′} ≡ {life} ∩ {~αsm =
~α
(∗)
sm}, where ~α
(∗)
sm stands for the particular values of these
parameters necessary for our existence. The parame-
ters ~αsm include fermion masses, coupling constants, etc.
This definition of “us” isn’t restrictive enough to enable
us to say what are the general survival requirements of
this subcategory. For example, ~αsm doesn’t determine
the baryon asymmetry or the dark matter density.
We can be more restrictive and define us as the inter-
section of intelligent life with the known parameters ~αsm
as well as all the unknown parameters which are relevant
for fundamental physics ~αother, {us
′} ≡ {life} ∩ {~αsm =
~α
(∗)
sm} ∩ {~αother = ~α
(∗)
other}. We don’t know what param-
eters ~αother are, these may be the parameters of super-
symmetry, string theory, etc. They may include informa-
tion about initial conditions. Even though we have tight-
ened the definition, it is still hard to make generic state-
ments about this subcategory of life forms: for example,
we can imagine compensation mechanisms between the
unknown and known parameters, creating two different
regions in the parameter-space in which life can be sus-
tained. We don’t know the degeneracy structure in the
subspace of ~αsm created by existence of the unknown
parameters ~αother.
The definition we adopt is that life is considered us-
like only if we are capable of making predictions about
the sufficient conditions for its existence. This is more
restrictive a definition from the ones considered above,
us ⊂ us′ ⊂ us′′ ⊂ life. Indeed, this definition is a very
tight one: even a minuscule change in the biological,
chemical, or nuclear construct of an organism can cause
dramatic changes to the conditions that were sufficient
for its evolution or survival, thus shifting the life-category
to which it belongs. Nonetheless, it is only this most re-
strictive form of “us” that can be used operationally, and
for which we can say something about P (Λ|us). For all
other definitions of “us” the strongest statement we can
justify is that “Λ” and “us” aren’t mutually exclusive,
based on the observations of the CC value and of our
existence.
Priors:
Imagine a universe with physics described by n parame-
ters αi, which in a particular realization take the values
of ai respectively. For brevity, we introduce the following
notation:
P (a1 . . . an) ≡
∫ a1+∆1
a1−∆1
dα1 . . .
∫ an+∆n
an−∆n
dαnP(α1 . . . αn)
where ±∆i is a small range around the observed
value ai of αi. Now consider the following probabili-
ties: (a) P (a1 . . . an), (b) P (a1 . . . an|A1 . . . Ak) and (c)
P (a1 . . . an|A1 . . . Ap), where k < p. A1, A2 . . . Ap are the
values of a “complete” set of observables, A1, . . . ,Ap, i.e.
if we measured all the Aj we would know the values of
all the αi. For simplicity we assume that the observables
aren’t degenerate with each other, p = n, and that we
can have a “perfect measurement” of them, meaning no
error bars (the generalizations are straight forward).
In (a) we ask what are the probabilities of all the pa-
rameters with flat priors. There isn’t anything else we
can say without additional information about the un-
derlying theory. The answer depends, of course, on the
parametrization. We will assume that the volume of the
region containing, say, the 95% confidence levels for all
the parameters is finite, V1. In (b) we have perfectly
measured a subset of observables, A1−Ak which provide
us with k constraints, reducing the number of uncon-
strained parameters from n to n − k. If we condition
the probability of the parameters with this observational
information, and if the observables Ai are sensitive to
combinations of the parameters αi, we should expect the
probability to be localized around the values ai, reducing
the 95% confidence level volume to V2, where V2 ≤ V1.
In (c), we ask what are the probabilities that the pa-
rameters take the values ai, given a measurement of all
observables. In this case we can give an exact answer,
P (a1 . . . an|A1 . . . An) = 1. So as we gather more infor-
mation and apply stronger priors, the PDFs shrink into
delta functions around the values which are consistent
with the observables. However, one should be careful
about what information this really contains – it tells us
what parameter values are most likely in this particular
realization, but it doesn’t give any information about the
original PDF of the theory. Tracing backwards from ex-
isting observations alone isn’t a particularly effective way
of constraining the underlying probability distribution of
possible fundamental theories.
Coming back to the CC issue, the original prob-
ability ratio P (Λ)/P (qΛ) of the theory is unknown,
though probably incredibly small because the pa-
rameter space of qΛ is vast. One can limit the
question to P (Λ|life)/P (qΛ|life), or even further to
3P (Λ|us)/P (qΛ|us). One may attempt to obviate this
source of uncertainty by defining anthropic arguments
in terms of entropy as in [3], but the question still comes
down to the same one: namely must life exploit entropy
generation under conditions comparable to what we ob-
serve today, or can it exploit it under vastly different
conditions? As shown above, it isn’t surprising that the
probabilities appear to grow more in favor of what we
actually observe. To take the above to extremity:
P (Λ|this paper)
P (qΛ|this paper)
=
1− ǫ
ǫ
(1)
where ǫ≪ 1. It would be wrong to take the above state-
ment as a “mechanism” to explain the observed value
of the CC. What (1) really tells us is that the value of
∼ 0.72 is the most probable existing value in our realiza-
tion, or to be more accurate, it reflects what we think we
know. We haven’t learned anything about the PDF in an
ensemble of all possible universes, and certainly haven’t
explained its value in the causal sense of the word.
Sampling:
We now attempt to quantify the difference between
putting a condition of “life”, and putting the stronger
condition of a life form which is “us”-like. One can imag-
ine a parameter space containing all the parameters rel-
evant to the emergence of life. Each point in this param-
eter space doesn’t necessarily specify a universe; there
might be additional parameters which don’t affect the
emergence of life but are necessary for a full description
of a universe. Over this parameter space we can define a
function Life, the probability of the emergence of life for
these parameter values, given all possible universes. Our
existence tells us that (modulo concerns about defining
probabilities in an infinite space) Life is non-zero at the
point in the parameter space where our universe lies, but
we don’t know Life’s value (no pun intended). Also, as
we are the only life form and this is the only universe
we know, we have no information whatsoever about how
Life extends over the rest of the parameter space. It
might spread over a wide range of parameters, implying
life can take many forms, or it might be a delta-function
located around parameter values which lead to our life
form. If the latter is true, the use of “us” or “life” as a
condition for the CC is the same in that it statistically
equates the states “life” and “us”. However, our lim-
ited data set which consists of a single sample of a single
point doesn’t probe much of the parameter space. The
fact that we know only “us” doesn’t mean that we are
the only possible life form .
An historical illustration of sampling bias may be
called the “New Guinea problem”: Imagine a scientist
native of a small isolated New Guinea mountain village
circa 1000 years ago. Looking around, she would see that
outside the hospitable valley of her village there are steep
mountains covered in thick jungle. With no evidence for
the existence of any people outside her own village, our
scientist would be led to identify the states of “life” and
“from-this-village”. Obviously this incorrect conclusion
is due purely to sampling bias. Today we may be in
the same situation. We don’t know of other life forms,
which often leads to the implicit assumption that we are
generic observers. We may, for example, assume that all
life exploits free energy in a way that tracks matter en-
tropy production (which is then argued to be dominated
by stellar processes [3]), but we emphasize that we have
no idea if this need be the case. For example, it has been
argued in [8] that most of the entropy of the universe is
in the gravitational radiation produced in the formation
of the supermassive black holes at the centers of galax-
ies. The conclusions derived based on different sampling
biases will be different [9, 10]. While the possibility that
we are typical observers exists, we don’t know how to es-
timate how probable it is, and we aren’t going to assume
anything about our typicality.
Considering the possibility that life may take many
forms, the conditioned probability ratio for the CC is
R ≡
P (Λ|life)
P (qΛ|life)
=
P (Λ|us)P (us|life) + P (Λ|qus)P (qus|life)
P (qΛ|us)P (us|life) + P (qΛ|qus)P (qus|life)
=
βα+ γ(1− α)
(1− β)α + (1− γ)(1− α)
, (2)
where we have defined α = P (us|life), β = P (Λ|us) and
γ = P (Λ|qus). We now examine a few limits of Eq. (2).
The case of α = 1 amounts to assuming we are the
only possible life form, which is sometimes an implicit
assumption in anthropic arguments. We get that there
is no difference between the priors of “life” and “us”,
R|α=1 = β/(1− β) = P (Λ|us)/P (qΛ|us), and R peaks as
β → 1. Standard Anthropic reasoning is to attempt to
evaluate β, and argue that β ≃ 1.
The opposite limit, α = 0, describes the case where
we are an anomaly, and in fact most life forms are very
different from us. We then get that R|α=0 = γ/(1−γ) 6=
P (Λ|us)/P (qΛ|us). It is interesting to notice that in this
limit, R peaks as γ → 1. A value of γ close to 1 means
that all life forms, even if very different from us, need a
CC within the same range as we do. If this is true, we
can say that even though our life form isn’t generic, the
CC range required for our existence is generic. However,
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FIG. 1: A contour plot of R over the most “favorable” corner
of the (α, γ) plane, with fixed β = 1 (left) and β = 10−5
(right). The shaded area indicates where R ≥ 0.1.
this result is independent of β and doesn’t imply that
what is generic is also required. We don’t have a way to
estimate what is a reasonable value for γ.
The one parameter we claim to have some information
about is β. Our generous category of the allowed range
for the CC together with our tight definition of “us” are
equivalent to fixing β = 1. In this limit R|β=1 = (α +
γ(1−α))/((1− γ)(1−α)). The left side of Fig. 1 shades
the area where R ≥ 0.1 in the (α, γ) parameter space,
with β = 1. As we are truly ignorant about α and γ,
we need to consider their logarithmic behavior to avoid
a bias toward any order of magnitude [7]. R becomes
substantial only as α → 1 or γ → 1, and that most of
the parameter space exhibits very low probability for the
observed value of the CC. The right side of Fig. 1 has
β = 10−5, which is the value that a certain weighing
scheme yields [10].
To summarize, we can say that our existence is a good
indicator of the observed CC. That is true by construc-
tion. The probability of the observed CC given the exis-
tence of life is high only if we are the most probable life
form, or if we somehow know that other life forms are as
good indicators as we are of the observed CC.
Discussion:
An issue that has often caused confusion in the absence
of well-defined theories is the difference between correla-
tion and causation. The solar neutrino rate in the Davis
experiment, for example, may have been correlated with
the US stock market, but few physicists would argue that
one had a causative effect on the other. In most cases,
as we describe in this paper, anthropic reasoning can
point to correlations between otherwise apparently unre-
lated physical parameters. However it cannot in general
demonstrate causation. In this regard, there are several
concepts that are often confused. Because some physi-
cal parameter is measured to take on some generic value
in many cases is not equivalent to the statement that
this value is required. For example, on earth, the exis-
tence of water is generically associated with life. How-
ever, there are life forms that can exist in the absence of
water (see for example [11]). Another concept which is
elusive is the difference between the attempt to explain
why the CC must be small vs the attempt to explain its
observed smallness. As anthropic reasoning relies on se-
lection effects, its best hope is to give information about
the probability of the observed smallness. As we have
explicitly demonstrated the statistical significance of the
fact that we observe a small CC depends on how typ-
ical observers we are. This crucial question, central to
much of the current literature associated with the Land-
scape, remains however almost completely open, in that
we currently have no scientific basis for answering it. As
a result any statistical inferences are at the present time
primarily wishful thinking.
Finally, the correlations illuminated by our limited an-
thropic understanding imply that what we ultimately
learn from these arguments is that the existence of us
and the existence of the observed value of Λ do not con-
tradict each other. That is nice, but hardly surprising.
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